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Kathleen A. Cahalan 
Technology and Temperance 
Today's technology transforms 
human life, presenting new challenges 
and prompting a fresh look at 
traditional virtues. 
There are two spirihlal dangers in not owning a farm. 
One is the danger of supposing that breakfast comes 
from the grocery .. and the other that heat comes from the 
furnace. To avoid the first danger, one should plant a 
garden, preferably where there is no grocer to confuse 
the issue. To avoid the second, he should lay a split of 
good oak on the andirons, preferably where there is no 
furnace, and let it warm his shins while a February bliz-
zard tosses the trees outside. If one has cut, split, hauled, 
and piled his ovvn good oak, and let his mind work the 
while, he will remember much about where the heat 
comes from, and with a wealth of detail denied to those 
who spend the weekend in town astride a radiator. 
Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1949) 
When we think of the relationship between technology and Christian 
faith, moral dilemmas such as nuclear power or nuclear arms and bio-
medical and reproductive technologies often come to mind. There is 
little doubt that these forms of technology define modernity in dis-
tinctive ways from the past, and they demand serious Christian morn! 
reflection on their right and proper use. But if technology is viewed 
primarily as a reality that exists in the neonatal intensive care unit, the 
laboratory or the military base, we may miss the way that technology 
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profoundly shapes and impacts everyday life, Consider for a moment 
the way technology is present as you read this article: A light illumi-
nates the page; the room is cool or warm depending upon where 
you live; a hot cup of coffee is in reach and when it cools off it can be 
re-heated in a microwave oven; and, after reading the article, you send 
an e-mail to a friend to tell about it. This set of conditions is quite 
normal to us, one that we take very much for granted, unless of course 
the power goes out, the furnace breaks or our modem is too slow. 
THE DEVICE PARADIGM 
A current philosopher of technology, Albert Borgmann, understands 
technology not as the primary problem of modern life, but as its pri-
mary condition (Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life). 
What is distinctive about modern technology from earlier forms of 
tools and machines, according to Borgmann, is what he calls the 
device paradigm. His best-known account of the device paradigm is 
the shift, since the Industrial Revolution, from the hearth and wood-
burning stove (focal things) to the central heating system (a device). 
The hearth or stove supplies warmth to a home and serves as a "focal 
point," a place of contact between people, who gather around a fire 
for conversation, meals and engagement. In addition to various kinds 
of human interaction, the hearth demands that human beings be in 
relationship to nature: hearths and stoves need to be tended each 
day, wood must be collected, chopped and stacked, and a fire kept 
burning. Certain skills and matters of knowledge are required to 
maintain a fire, which do not come "naturally" but must be learned 
and passed on from one generation to the next. The hearth, then, 
demands a certain kind of familial and social engagement between 
persons as well as a relationship between people and nature. 
The crucial aspect of a device, according to Borgmann, is that it 
provides a commodity, in this case warmth, separate from a social and 
natural context and from a burden (chopping and stacking wood, 
and stoking a fire). Consumption is directly connected to technol-
ogy because what is consumed are the commodities produced by 
technology-the pleasurable product disconnected from the burden-
some labor. More and better technology allows for more and more 
commodities to be consumed with less and less effort. The opposite 
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of the device (the central heating system) is a focal thing and focal 
practice (the hearth and chopping wood) that are directly connected 
to nature, culture, social engagement and the body, whereas a device 
severs the commodity from its context. For example, the relation-
ship to a device is quite different from a relationship to a focal thing, 
because devices are made in such a way that our only relationship to 
them is to use them. Try, for instance, fixing a furnace, dishwasher 
or automobile. Devices are constructed so that no skill or knowledge 
is required to maintain them. We are "disburdened" from the rela-
tionship, both from knowledge about as well as responsibility for 
the device; a focal th.ing, in contrast, is quite burdensome, as anyone 
who has chopped wood and tended a hearth knows. 
Examples of the device paradigm abound: buying and listening 
to CDs, rather than playing music or attending a concert; commu-
nicating via cell phones or e-mail, rather than being present face-to-
face; encountering artificial or virtual reality (the Wilderness Lodge 
at Disney World) rather than the real thing (the Rocky Mountains). 
Borgmann is particularly interested in how the device paradigm 
affects our relationship to food, meals and the table in American 
homes. Meals have become "fast food" that can be purchased and 
consumed at a drive-up facility; the table, for many, is no longer a 
central gathering each day for meals and conversation in the home. 
Not only does food production take place far away, the daily prepa-
ration of food and meals has been lost to the device paradigm (for 
example, McDonald's or the frozen dinner). 
FOCAL THINGS AND FOCAL PRACTICES 
Borgmann's answer to the device paradigm is twofold. First is the 
need to be more conscious of the device paradigm; it does not have 
to deplete us of vital and dynamic relationships with each other and 
with nature. He does not advocate tossing away microwaves, com-
puters and televisions or never again purchasing fast food or frozen 
dinners-there is nothing inherently wrong or evil about this tech-
nology and the use of it The microwave dinner may enable us to get 
.to the Little League ballgame on time and engage in the focal prac-
tice of gathering with neighbors and friends at a local park to watch 
the game together. What we fail to realize, however, is that the most 
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dangerous feature of the device is the fact that it is hidden, removed 
and concealed from daily life. The commodities are all around us: 
light, warmth, music from the radio, even food, but both the device 
and the labor connected to it have vanished from sight. Devices 
create a false kind of freedom: Human persons live under the illu-
sion that all of life's burdens can be solved by better and more effi-
cient technology. Some people contend that technology has enslaved 
rather than freed human persons, and obviously more and more 
time is spent acquiring and managing all these devices-a new kind 
of burden. Borgmann agrees that technology has altered human free-
dom in significant ways, but the freedom it allows is freedom from 
that which is most essential to human life: its burdens, frictions and 
struggles for creating a good life together. We may, for example, 
continue to seek more and better medicines to cure disease/ but this 
will never free us from caring for the sick and dying. 
Borgmann's second response to the device paradigm is to create 
and engage in focal practices and things. Focal practices and things 
have (at least) three characteristics. First, they have a "commanding 
presence," which means focal practices and things make demands on 
us. To engage a focal practice (for example, making a meal) requires 
patience/ skilt endurance and discipline. In contrast/ devices are 
usually disposable, requiring little skill or enduring practice (for 
example, heating a frozen dinner in the microwave). Second, a focal 
thing or practice has a "telling continuity" between the self and the 
environment; devices are usually discontinuous from their context. 
Take, for example, Borgmann's example of the runner who takes the 
path along the Rattlesnake Creek-she is engaged with the sights, 
sounds, smells of the outdoors, the rigors of the path, the possibility 
of poor weather and the chance encounter with wild animals. In con-
trast, a runner who uses a machine at the health center and watches a 
video of the Rattlesnake Creek is still exercising her muscles, but her 
experience of the environment is diminished from its true context. 
The numer may achieve the same amount of exercise (the commod-
ity) whether she is on the path or in the health club; the danger lies in 
never encountering the wilderness as wildernessT but only as a manu-
factured reality of video images. 
Focal things and practices also have "centering or unifying 
powers." They embrace a web of relations to self, others and nature, 
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and maintain a unity between means and ends. What is lost, for 
example, if a family never engages in growing some kind of food, 
even if it is as simple as a potted tomato vine growing on the bal-
cony or a small garden of herbs? Some children may believe that 
food comes from McDonald's or the supermarket-they may never 
know or encounter its source in nature or learn the skills of growing 
and harvesting food. Most importantly, for Borgmann, they never 
encounter the demands, responsibilities, the sheer burden and joy 
of producing food and making meals. 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 
A central theological question in relationship to Borgmann's descrip-
tion and prescription regarding the device paradigm is anthropo-
logical: What kind of human beings are we becoming by living in 
the device paradigm? Is our everyday use of technology altering or 
warping _fundamental human capacities in ways that erode the 
basis for Christian spirituality and morality? One theologian who 
has taken up Borgmann's analysis of the device paradigm is Richard 
Gaillardetz in his book, Transforming Our Days: Spirituality, Commu-
nity, and Liturgy in a Technological Culture. Gaillardetz argues for two 
Christian responses to the device paradigm: a new mystagogy and 
new form of asceticism. The new mystagogy fosters "a more pro-
found recognition of the presence of God as Holy Mystery emerg-
ing from within the warp and woof of our daily lives." Engaging 
in the most basic and fundamental of human practices opens up the 
possibility of encountering the divine presence in the most ordinary 
and mundane aspects of life. Gaillardetz describes how buying 
lunch at McDonald's can be a mystagogical encounter if through a 
certain level of moral and spiritual awareness people are connected 
to those who make and serve the food as fellow human beings, and 
not as extensions of the device paradigm. 
Along with a growing awareness of divine grace in the ordinary, 
Gaillardetz calls for a new asceticism: a disciplined way of living the 
paschal mystery that embraces the limits that are part of all human 
experience. Teclmology seduces us into b~lieving that we can remove 
the burdensome, ugly, difficult and painful, which is certainly a con-
tradiction for those who strive to live the life of Christ. For Gaillardetz, 
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"an authentic Christian asceticism affirms that in the plan of God 
human fulfillment can .only come from the free embrace of that which 
technology and modern consumerism tempt us to circumvent: con-
straint, loss, and the necessary 'friction' of human existence." A new 
asceticism demands that we consciously enter into practices that are 
burdensome and that require self-giving and self-sacrifice. 
Gaillardetz joins several moral philosophers (Albert Borgmann, 
Alasdair Macintyre) and Christian theologians (Dorothy C. Bass, 
Larry Rasmussen) who have taken up the concept of practices. For 
example, the authors of the book, Practicing our Faith (ed. Dorothy 
C. Bass) identify twelve practices that are "shared activities that 
address fundamental human needs and that, woven together, form 
a way of life." The practices-honoring the body, hospitality, house-
hold economics, saying yes and saying no, keeping Sabbath, testi-
mony, discernment, shaping communities, forgiveness, healing, 
dying well, singing our lives-are basic anthropological and social 
activities, and when they are known, taught and passed on within 
the Christian community, a way of life emerges that is consistent 
with the life of Jesus Christ. 
Practices point to a corrununal, historical and narrative anthro-
pology. They help to overcome the divorce between means and ends 
that devices promote; they keep in focus the true ends of the good or 
the Christian life as well as the means proper to those ends. In terms 
of practices, means include the critical forms of human agency that 
require skills, disciplines and know-how. Practices such as hospitality, 
meals around a family table or a congregation's care for the elderly 
are grounded in a tradition that is both historical and narrative: 
People come to know who they are in and through the corrununity's 
basic practices. Community, then, is more than shared values or 
principles-it is shared practices. The central practice for Christians 
that grounds all other practices, according to Gaillardetz, is the 
liturgy. Liturgical celebrations draw Christians into a sacramental 
encounter with grace as well as the paschal mystery-both are 
essential for discovering grace in the ordinary world and responding 
to the rhythms of suffering and redemption. 
In his 1981 book, After Virtue, Macintyre connects the concept of 
practices to the traditional category of virtue, a topic that Borgmann 
and Gaillardetz do not take up. Vrrtue, for Macintyre, is an "acquired 
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human quality" that develops through the engagement of practices 
over time. Virtues help to realize the goods that are "internal" to 
practices and that cannot be acquired in any other way but through 
practice. For example, the kind of courage, patience and knowledge 
that come from hiking or running in the Rocky Mountains cannot 
be acquired in the health club while watching a video of the Rocky 
Mountains; this is not to say that a person cannot acquire courage, 
patience and knowledge of the wilderness through other experiences, 
but that something is lost if the video is the only encounter with the 
wilderness. Virtue, for Macintyre, is not an abstract or metaphysical 
reality, but is conditioned by a tradition of practice that is deemed 
valuable and important by a particular community. Certain commu-
nities will place a high premium on particular virtues because they 
value particular practices. Baseball offers a good example. Baseball, 
in order to be played well, requires learning what the game is and 
how it is played, skill in handling a bat and ball, and discipline and 
perseverance in honing skills and acquiring greater agility and facil-
ity in the game. By engaging in the game of baseball over time, a 
person comes to acquire certain virtues such as honesty, fair play, 
patience and being a "good loser." As the great American pastime, 
the importance of baseball is not "whether you win or lose, but how 
you play the game." The external goods (for example, winning a 
trophy, wearing a uniform) are distinct from the "goods" that are 
internal to the practice (for example, the kind of person that devel-
ops through playing baseball). Moral character cannot arise, develop 
and flourish, in other words, if a person is not engaged in the com-
munity's central "focal practices" of everyday life. 
Virtues are the inner qualities that emerge from practice but are 
also essential to good practice. Practices and virtues, then, exist in a 
dialectical relationship. Focal practices shape, develop and nurture 
certain human traits, dispositions, and virtues. For example, engag-
ing in the practice of gardening fosters gratitude for things of the 
earth, skills at helping living things to grow, an awareness that all 
living things are interconnected and dependent, patience in the face 
of bad weather and hope in returning to the garden when a season 
of failure has devastated the plants and ground. It is only through 
engaging the practice of gardening over the course of time that one 
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can acquire greater skill in gardening as well as the virtues neces-
sary to be a good gardener. The virtues that are acquired are essen-
tial for long-term engagement in the practice, as well as for engaging 
other kinds of practices. Virtues, then, transcend particular practices 
by creating the inner qualities necessary for other practices. For 
instance, the practice of gardening engenders virtues that are essen-
tial for raising children, coping with loss or working toward more 
just environmental conditions. 
The focus on practices has helped to enlarge the concept of virtue 
beyond a more traditional individualistic and privatized notion of 
the self and the moral life. Practices make virtue communal as well 
as personal. If focal practices are essential to living fully and faith-
fully in the device paradigm, as Borgmann and Gaillardetz contend, 
what are the virtues that are critical to these practices? What virtues 
are necessary for the proper use of technology that does not suc-
cumb to the device paradigm? 
TEMPERANCE AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 
No single virtue is the key to living with modern technology. Obvi-
ously, a full range of virtues as well as practices must be cultivated 
by communities of faith. Traditional virtues such as faith, hope and 
charity as well as virtues identified by modem theologians are nec-
essary: truthfulness, asceticism, reverence, gratitude (Romano Guar-
dini); humility, vigilance, serenity, readiness (Bernard Haring); and 
happiness, friendship, obedience and patience (Stanley Hauerwas). 
In examining the list of ancient and contemporary virtues, one virtue 
stands out as particularly helpful for living amidst modern tech-
nology and the device paradigm-the virtue of temperance. Tem-
perance has traditionally been understood as a cardinal virtue, "one 
of the four hinges on which swings the gate of life." It is often mis-
understood to mean complete abstinence, as in the temperance 
movement of the 1930s; its more traditional meaning refers to mod-
eration in the use and consumption of material goods. In addition 
to moderation, however, temperance has an additional, perhaps 
more fundamental definition. Temperance also refers to interior 
order and unity. For example, temperance is related to the Greek. 
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word, sophrosyne, which means "directing reason" in a broad sense, 
and in Latin, temperantia, meaning to dispose various parts into a 
unified and ordered whole. 
Augustine, perhaps more than any other saint or theologian, 
understood the way in which the self lacks unity and order when it 
seeks to fill itself with pleasures and desires apart from God. True 
order and unity come only from God, he discovered, and temperance 
keeps the self centered in God. For Augustine, temperance "controls 
and quells the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw 
us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness." Because 
human persons are inclined toward a kind of inordinate desire for 
food, sex, money or possessions, they acquire and attach themselves 
to objects that eventually come to replace God as the center of the 
self. The self is ultimately lost when it turns from God to follow its 
own desire, and so temperance guards a person's integrity arid pre-
serves true freedom "from corruption for God's sake." 
For Aquinas, temperance is distinct from the other cardinal 
virtues because it "aims at each man himself," whereas justice, 
courage and fortitude are directed toward relations between persons. 
Aquinas also takes up the theme of inner order and unity by stress-
ing the distinction between selfless and selfish self-preservation. 
Desire for food, sex and material things is a natural good because it 
aims toward preserving the self (body and soul) in order to love 
and serve God and neighbor. Temperance is selfless self-preservation 
that maintains proper desire for goods and pleasures; selfish self-
preservation can only end in self-destruction. 
The understanding of temperance as an ordered and unified 
sense of self in relationship to God is also connected to the moderate 
use of material goods. According to Aquinas, temperance is directed 
to the passions that become attached to "bodily and sensible goods" 
that bring pleasure to the five senses. These goods are not opposed 
to reason, but in fact are necessary to human life; the problem lies in 
seeking pleasure through external goods disproportionate to the self. 
The passionate desire for bodily and sensible goods, absent reason, 
leads to a long list of vices: gluttony, drunkenness, lust, incontinence, 
anger, cruelty, pride and curiosity. Self-indulgent and intemperate 
behavior also leads to the misuse and abuse of material goods. 
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Temperance is not the same for every person. Moderation and in 
some cases abstinence are crucial for a unified and ordered sense of 
self in relationship to God and the material world. What each person 
requires in terms of moderation and abstinence will differ because 
the passions and attachments that lead to self-destruction differ for 
each person. But the acquisition of and disposition toward temper-
ance are not an individual or solo quest, for temperance can only 
be discovered, acquired and nurtured through communal practices. 
More specifically, communitie~, such as families, congregations and 
neighborhoods, must conscio.:isly strive to nurture an ordered and 
unified sense of the self and the community in relationship to God, 
as well as moderate use of material goods. 
Temperance seems particularly important for fostering a proper 
relationship to technology and the dangers of the device paradigm. 
Is it easy to understand the power and attraction of devices, for the 
commodities they provide and the pleasures they offer are often good 
and valuable. But absent a true sense of the self, human lives can 
be consumed by acquiring more and better devices. Temperance 
reminds us that true pleasure and freedom are found not in acquir-
ing and consuming more, but in right relationship with God and 
neighbor. Secondly, devices create an illusion that technology solves 
the problems facing humanity. But unity and order for Christians are 
found in the paschal mystery, which does not deny pain and death, 
but actively seeks companionship with those who suffer. Finally, 
devices further threaten humanity's relationship to nature. Temper-
ance helps us to see all creation as a gift from God to be used wisely, 
justly and with moderation. This very brief examination of temper-
ance reveals an ancient insight about virtue: Acquiring one virtue 
means acquiring all virtues. Temperance, finally, is only one of many 
virtues needed to live faithfully in relationship to modem technol-
ogy and the device paradigm. Practices that foster temperance will 
also nurture the virtues of stewardship, gratitude and generosity. 
